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Abstract:
This paper discusses the matter of parents prior right to provide his/her child with care in situa-
tions in which a child’s parent is a person with intellectual disabilities. The author analyzes the 
case of A.K. and L. v. Croatia in which European Court of Human Rights concluded that it come 
to violation of the right to family life of A.K, a mother with an intellectual disability and her son 
L., who was adopted without the mother’s consent. 
The paper presents a critical review of Croatian family law in a matter of a parent’s consent for 
an adoption when the parent is a person with intellectual disabilities. By connecting contem-
porary standpoints of the European Court of Human Rights and the latest scientific knowledge 
about the ability of persons with intellectual disabilities to take care of their child, the author 
discusses a possible conflict between the principle of child’s best interest and the priority right of 
a parent to take care of his/her child. Also, the author warns about the danger of a parent with 
intellectual disabilities being deprived of his/her parental rights and completely excluded from 
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thor also discusses the latest reforms of the family law concerning protection of parental rights of 
persons deprived of their capacity for work. 
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i.  iNtroDUCtioN 
in the case of A.K. and L. v. Croatia1 (hereinafter: A.K. and L. v. C.), the first applicant 
was a person with a mild mental disability2 who applied to the european Court of Human 
rights (hereinafter: eCtHr) due to violation of the right to family life between her and 
her son l. since a.K. was, following a decision of the competent court, divested of her 
parental rights in respect of l. and since according to the Croatian family law legislation, 
no parent’s consent for child adoption is required if the parent has been divested of his/
her parental rights, l. was adopted without consent of a.K. what is disputable in this case 
is the reasoning of the competent national court implying that due to her mild mental 
disability and scoliosis, a.K. should have been provided assistance in the protection her 
rights and interests because she was not able to protect them herself and she should have 
been provided professional help and support in the exercise of her parental rights, instead 
of having been divested thereof. Nonetheless, a.K. had been, based on a decision of the 
competent court which adjudicated following a request of the welfare Centre, divested of 
her parental rights, after which l. was adopted without her consent. although a.K. had 
never directly hurt the interests of her child and even though she, within the limits set by 
her (mild) mental disability, had shown concern for her child and expressed a wish to pro-
ceed with maintaining family life with her child, the system did not protect her parental 
rights and thus, referring to the best interests of the child, irreversibly broke the family 
bond between a.K. and her son l. 
1   A. K. and L. v. Croatia, eCtHr, application no. 37956/11 [2013]
2   t. Not explains it in a way that people with mental disabilities should be classified as disabled persons. This 
author stresses that people with mental disabilities are also known as persons with developmental disabili-
ties or persons with special needs, but the term of persons with intellectual disabilities has lately prevailed 
in this context. she also warns that the differences in the terminology and definitions, which exist both in 
professional books and relevant regulations, may affect the consistence of law enforcement and bring to 
denial of certain privileges and rights. see t. Not, ’’mentalna retardacija: definicija, klasifikacija i suvre-
mena podrška osobama s intelektualnim teškoćama, eng. mental Disability: Definition, Classification and 
Contemporary support to persons with intellectual Disabilities’’, Nova prisutnost, vol. 6, no. 3, 2008, p. 341. 
a. Došen also observes that the term of mental retardation (disability) has been substituted with the term 
of intellectual disability which is defined as ’’a deficiency in psychosocial development (particularly its cog-
nitive segment) with respect to an average person of the same chronological age.“ she then suggests that 
’’pursuant to international systems of classification of mental disorders (Dsm iv and iCD 10), intellectual 
disabilities are classified according to the following criteria:
- reduced cognitive ability (iq score in psychometric tests below 70)
- difficulties in adaptive behaviour  
- diagnosis before the age of 18 years.“ This author emphasizes that intellectual difficulties are not mental 
but developmental disorders and hence they cannot be treated or cured like some other illnesses but one 
should  focus on stimulation of possible development. see a. Došen, ’’poremećaji ponašanja i psihički 
poremećaji osoba s intelektualnim teškoćama, eng. behavioural Disorders and mental Disorders of per-
sons with intellectual Disabilities’’, Socijalna psihijatrija, vol. 38, no. 2, 2010, p. 109-110.
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This paper begins with analysis of the circumstances of the case of A.K. and L. v. C, 
basic objections of the applicant and conclusions of the eCtHr. all the controversial 
case-related issues of child adoption without consent of the parent with intellectual and 
physical disabilities are also taken into consideration. The paper attempts to answer if 
there is a conflict between the principle of the best interest of the child and the funda-
mental parental right to provide childcare even in case of a parent’s intellectual disability. 
since the judgment in the case of A.K. and L. v. C. was passed when the Family act was 
in force3 [(hereinafter: Fa (2003)], the relevant legal issues are viewed through the prism 
of this act. taking account of the standpoints of the eCtHr in the case of A.K. and L. v. 
C, the new Family act4 [hereinafter: Fa (2015)] has brought some novelties relating to 
the protection of the parental rights of those who are not capable of protecting their own 
rights and interests, which is also discussed in this paper.  
although the judgment uses the term of ’mental disability’, the respective literature has 
recently replaced it with the notion of ’intellectual disability’5, so wherever in the paper 
reference is not made exclusively to the judgment in the case of A.K. and L. v. C., the term 
of ’intellectual  disability’ will be preferred.6
II.  CAsE OF A.k. AND L. v. C. 7
2. 1.  The Circumstances of the Case 
The first applicant a.K. was born in 1987. The second applicant l., the biological son 
of the first applicant was born on 10 December 2008. by a decision of the K. welfare Cen-
tre of 19 December 2008, l. was placed in a foster family in another town, on the ground 
that the first applicant was unemployed and had no income, was supported by her mother, 
attended a special needs programme in school and lived with her mother and mentally ill 
brother in an old and dilapidated house without heating. 
The welfare Centre drew the conclusion that a.K. is mildly mentally retarded and 
lodged a request with the court proposing that a.K. be divested of parental rights since 
she lived in poor housing conditions, in untidy and unmaintained premises, since she had 
3   obiteljski zakon, eng. Family act  (official gazette 116/03, 17/04, 136/04, 107/07, 57/11, 61/11)
4   obiteljski zakon, eng. Family act (official gazette no. 103/15)
5   see footnote no. 2. 
6   Zakon o socijalnoj skrbi, eng. social welfare act (official gazette no. 157/13, 152/14, 99/15) in its article 
4 item 9 defines a disabled person as ’’a person with long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory im-
pairment which may, in interaction with various drawbacks, prevent such a person from full and efficient 
participation in the society on an equal footing to a person without disabilities’’. 
7  quoted from the judgment in the case of A. K. and L. v. Croatia
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visited her son only twice in a one-year time and was not interested in him, so she, ac-
cording to the Centre’s opinion, had abandoned her child and had not created appropriate 
conditions for joint life with her child within a year after the child had been separated 
from its family. The first applicant contested the request and asked the court to restore 
her parental rights and give her a chance to care for the child again. For the sake of deter-
mining the facts in the case, the competent municipal Court ordered the first applicant to 
undergo psychiatric expertise. The expertise resulted in the diagnosis that a.K. was affect-
ed by a mild intellectual disability accompanied with severe scoliosis and that due to her 
mental and physical condition, she was not capable of providing her son with good care. 
on 10 may 2010, the K. municipal Court divested the first applicant of her parental 
rights in respect of her son l., stating that ’’this court accepts the opinion of the expert ... 
and considers that the mother ... is not able to care for l. owing to her health – advanced 
scoliosis – she is not able to pick the child up, hold him in her arms, run after him, or pre-
vent him from hurting himself, because the scoliosis prevents her from moving quickly. 
in addition, at the hearings held before this court, [hereinafter: the Court] established that 
the mother spoke with difficulty and had a limited vocabulary, which indicated a risk that, 
if entrusted to his mother’s care, the child would not learn to speak or would learn to do 
so with a delay. it is questionable whether he would be able to start his schooling on time, 
because he would surely be behind in his development in comparison with other children 
of the same age; so this Court cannot allow that to happen, because the child has the right 
to a life of good quality in orderly surroundings with all the necessary care, and, above all, 
in sanitary conditions, none of which he would have with his mother.
in her reply the respondent stated that she wished to try to care for her son l., but this 
Court, in order to protect the wellbeing of the child, cannot allow such an experiment.“ 
on 28 october 2010, the first applicant’s legal aid lawyer lodged a request with the K. 
municipal Court, asking it to restore her parental rights in respect of l. The first applicant 
alleged that her living conditions had significantly changed after the decision divesting 
her of her parental rights had been adopted. Thus, her mentally ill brother no longer lived 
in the same household but had been placed in an institution; the house had been partly 
renovated and a heating system had been installed. she also argued that a mild intellectual 
disability should not be a reason for depriving her of her parental rights and that the alle-
gations that she did not know how to prepare meals or care for a child had not been true. 
Furthermore, no expert opinion had established that she had a speech problem and had 
limited vocabulary or a limited ability to reason which would create a risk that the child, 
if entrusted to her care, would not learn how to speak.
on 10 December 2010, the first applicant informed the welfare Centre that in a tele-
phone conversation with l.’s guardian, which took place on 7 December 2010, she had 
learned that l. had been put up for adoption. she asked the welfare Centre to provide 
her with all the relevant information concerning the adoption of her son l. on 14 De-
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cember 2010, the welfare Centre replied that l. had been adopted by the final decision of 
15 october 2010 and that no consent for adoption was needed from the parent who had 
been divested of parental rights, and that such a parent could not be a party to adoption 
proceedings.8 No further information could be given to her since the data concerning the 
adoption were confidential.
2.2.  The Applicant’s Objections
The first applicant complained that hers and her son’s right to respect for family life 
protected by the european Convention on Human rights9 (hereinafter: eCHr) under ar-
ticle 8 thereof10 had been infringed in that she could not effectively participate in the pro-
ceedings concerning her parental rights, and that her son was put up for adoption without 
her knowledge, consent or participation in the adoption proceedings.
The first applicant also complained, under article 6 of the eCHr, that she had not 
been a party to the adoption proceedings, that she had not given her consent to the adop-
tion and that she had never been informed that such proceedings had been instituted. in 
this connection, the first applicant complained that her child’s guardian had been an em-
ployee of the welfare Centre that had carried out the adoption proceedings, and claimed 
that the guardian had influenced the initiation of the adoption proceedings instead of 
protecting the first applicant’s rights.
The first applicant also complained that her child had been taken from her owing to 
her intellectual disability and physical impairment and that therefore she had been dis-
criminated against on that basis. she relied on article 1411 of the eCHr.
2.3.  Basic Conclusions of the ECtHR
while judging in this case, the eCtHr noted as follows:
8   pursuant to article 138 paragraph 3 of the Fa (2003), parents whose consent for child adoption is not re-
quired shall not be deemed a party in adoption proceedings.
9   The eCHr was adopted by the Council of europe in 1950, it came into force in 1953 and Croatia ratified it 
together with its protocols in 1997.
10   Article 8 of the ECHR, reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accord-
ance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or 
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
11   relevant part of article 14 of the eCHr reads as follows:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimina-
tion on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”
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“The Court considers that the national authorities should have ensured that, in view 
of the importance of the proceedings at issue for her right to respect for her family life, 
the first applicant’s interests were adequately protected in the proceedings at issue. That 
the first applicant could not properly understand the full legal effect of such proceedings 
and adequately argue her case and thus protect her rights and interests as the biological 
mother of l., is evidenced by her above-described personal circumstances. ... The Court 
finds it difficult to accept that a person whose speech impediment and limited vocabulary 
were taken as grounds to fear that she would not be able to teach her child to speak prop-
erly, would be able to argue her case in proceedings before the national courts concerning 
her parental rights. ... owing to the decision of 10 may 2010, divesting the first applicant 
of her parental rights in respect of l., the first applicant was subsequently excluded from 
the adoption of l. Therefore, in the proceedings preceding a decision of such paramount 
consequences, the applicants’ rights and interests should have been adequately protected 
by the first applicant being provided with proper assistance by a lawyer in the interests 
of affording her the requisite consideration of her views and protection of her interests 
as well as those of her biological son l. from the standpoint of preserving ties with his 
biological mother. while those proceedings were pending, the first applicant learned on 
7 December 2010 that l. had already been adopted. The proceedings for restoring the first 
applicant’s parental rights were therefore terminated on 28 January 2011. No further rem-
edy would have served any purpose, since no proceedings concerning the first applicant’s 
parental rights could be continued owing to the fact that l. had already been adopted. The 
Court further notes that the first applicant was not informed of the adoption proceedings 
and was not heard at any time in that connection. since she was not a party to the adop-
tion proceedings she had no right to use any remedy in the context of those proceedings. 
while the Court can accept that her consent, owing to the fact that she had been divested 
of her parental rights, was not necessary in the adoption proceedings, it nevertheless con-
siders that where, as in Croatia, a national system allows for parental rights to be restored, 
it is indispensable that a parent be given an opportunity to exercise that right before the 
child is put up for adoption, should such a possibility have any meaning. in the present 
case, by not informing the first applicant about the adoption proceedings the national 
authorities deprived her of the opportunity to seek restoration of her parental rights be-
fore the ties between the biological parent and child were finally severed by the child’s 
adoption. she was thus prevented from enjoying her right guaranteed by the Family act.“
against this background the eCtHr concluded that it came to violation of article 8 of 
the Convention. Having found violation of this provision, the eCtHr concluded that no 
separate issue arises under article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The eCtHr also concluded that 
it is not necessary to examine any further complaint under article 14 of the Convention. 
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III.   WHAT Is DIsPUTAbLE IN THE CAsE OF A. k. AND L. v. C 
IN REGARD TO CHILD ADOPTION WITHOUT CONsENT 
OF A MOTHER WITH INTELLECTUAL AND PHYsICAL 
DIsAbILITIEs?
as shown in the circumstances of the case of A. K. and L. v. C, the welfare Centre did 
not require consent of a. K. for adoption of her son l. Furthermore, despite the resistance 
to divest her of parental rights and her struggle for the child’s return, the child was adopt-
ed without her knowledge and consent. The circumstances in this case entail that one 
should take into consideration the legal frameworks regulating consent of parents with 
intellectual and physical disabilities.
First of all, it is important to accentuate that parents’ intellectual and physical disa-
bilities themselves shall, neither pursuant to the Fa (2003) nor in line to the Fa (2015)12, 
constitute a ground on which a child could be adopted without consent of its parents.13 
in the judgment A. K. and L. v. C. disability is not stated as the reason why the welfare 
Centre did not require consent of a.K. for adoption of l., but only deprivation of her pa-
rental rights. in fact, in compliance with the Fa (2003), a child may be adopted without 
12   see Chapter v.
13   Obiteljski zakon, eng. The Family Act (official gazette 162/98) encompassed a provision, according to 
which adoption could be carried out against the will or without consent of the non-resident parent if such 
has grossly neglected their care for the child for over three months (article 129 paragraph 2). it is hard 
to assume which circumstances may lead to a failure of the non-resident parent to care for their child for 
over three months. it is certain that the circumstances due to which a parent might grossly neglect the care 
for their child do not necessarily have to arise solely from the action of the parent, so this provision hid 
the danger of adopting the child against the will of the non-resident parent and in case the parent could 
not provide the child with proper care for objective reasons for over three months. among other things, a 
parent’s intellect disabilities might be the cause that he/she does not properly care for her/his child, which 
does not necessarily mean that the parent has no emotional bonds with the child or that he/she does not 
want to provide proper care for the child, but more likely that the former is not (currently) capable thereof 
due to his/her intellectual disabilities. it is this issue that appeared in the case of A.K. and L. v. C. if this 
provision had been in force at the time when the welfare Centre decided on child adoption in the referring 
case, it would have represented a legal ground for adoption against the will of a.K. even if there had been 
no judicial decision on the divestment of parental rights. Having observed the dangers emerging from 
the legal possibility that the welfare Centre makes a discretional assessment if it would come to adoption 
against the will of a parent with parental rights, the legislator, by adopting the Fa (2003), withdrew such a 
legal possibility. it is worth mentioning that the research conducted by D. Hrabar and a. Korać-graovac 
has demonstrated that all the possibilities foreseen by the Fa (1998) relating to adoption without a parent’s 
consent, in respective cases, the welfare centres applied only the prerequisite that a parent had already 
been divested of his/her parental rights and they did not exercise their power to determine the circum-
stances of the case and make an adoption decision against the will of the parent pursuant to article  129 
paragraph 2of the Family act (1998). see D. Hrabar and a. Korać-graovac, Primjena obiteljskopravnih 
mjera za zaštitu dobrobiti djece te zasnivanje posvojenja bez pristanka roditelja, eng. Implementation of 
Family Law Measures for the Protection of the Well-Being of Children and Adoption without Consent of the 
Parents, Zagreb, pravni fakultet sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 2003, p. 119.
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consent of a parent deprived of their parental rights, a parent fully incapacitated for work 
and a minor parent who cannot comprehend the meaning of adoption.14 to sum up, since 
a.K. was divested of her parental rights, she was not invited to provide consent for the 
adoption of her son. 
The european Convention on the adoption of Children (revised)15 stipulates that adop-
tion shall not be granted without consent of the parents, but if the father or mother is not a 
holder of parental responsibility in respect of the child, or at least of the right to consent to 
an adoption, the law may provide that it shall not be necessary to obtain his or her consent.16
europe’s white paper  on principles concerning the establishment and legal 
consequences of parentage17 also sets forth that adoption shall not be granted without 
consent of the mother and father, but consent of the mother or the father or both of them 
shall not be required if they are not holders of parental rights.18
indeed, from the aspect of both international and national law, there is nothing con-
troversial in the fact that in the case of A.K. and L. v. C, l. was adopted without consent of 
his mother a.K. who had been previously divested of her parental rights. However, what 
requires speculations is the ground for divestment of the first applicant’s parental rights 
and their close link with her intellectual disabilities and severe scoliosis. after psychiatric 
examination, a.K. was diagnosed with a mild mental disability accompanied with severe 
scoliosis, which makes her incapable of caring for her son. The welfare Centre had pre-
viously ascertained that the mother does not maintain personal hygiene nor cleans her 
housing premises. it is to be assumed that such conduct has resulted from her intellectual 
disability, due to which the applicant was not able to understand the dangers of such a way 
14   article 130 of the Fa (2003)
15   The european Convention on the adoption of Children was adopted in strasbourg in 1967. in 2008, the 
Council of europe opened the revised european Convention on the adoption of Children for signing. 
The revised Convention entered into force on 1 september 2011. Croatia has neither signed the european 
Convention on the adoption of Children (1967) nor the revised european Convention on the adoption of 
Children (2008). see a comparative view to these Conventions in a. Korać graovac, ’’europska konvencija 
o posvojenju djece, eng. european Convention on the adoption of Children’’, Dijete i društvo, vol. 11, no. 
1/2, 2009, pp. 279-292. see also D. Hrabar, ’’posvojenje na razmeđi interesa posvojitelja i posvojenika, eng. 
adoption at the Crossroads between adopters and adopted Children’’, Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta 
u Zagrebu, vol. 58, no. 5, 2008, pp. 1107-1139, D. Jakovac-lozić, ’’Ususret novoj europskoj konvenciji o 
posvojenju djece, eng. meeting the New european Convention on the adoption of Children’’, Zbornik 
radova Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Mostaru, 2007, pages 91-121.  
16   see article 5, paragraph 1 item a and paragraph 4 of the european Convention on the adoption of Children.
17   Council of europe’s Committee of experts on Family law on 15 January 2002 adopted a “white paper on 
principles concerning the establishment and legal consequences of parentage”. “white paper” contains 29 
principles which are contained in the following 3 parts: principles relating to the establishment of legal 
parentage; principles relating to legal consequences of parentage; and possible legal consequences where 
parentage has not been established.
18  see principle 15.
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of life for her and the child. Therefore, one can conclude that the intellectual disabilities 
did not set grounds for not requiring the a. K. consent for the adoption. yet, the intellec-
tual and physical disabilities had resulted in the mother’s incapability to provide the child 
with proper care, which motivated the competent Court to divest her of parental rights. 
so, it can be implied that in this concrete case, it was the mother’s intellectual and physical 
impairment that brought to adoption of the child without her consent.
in this respect, one can raise the question whether a parent’s intellectual and physical 
disability can constitute a firm ground for divestment of his/her parental rights. pursuant 
to the Fa (2003), which was in force at the time when the decision on the divestment of 
the first applicant’s parental rights was made, the reasons for divestment of parental rights 
include abuse and severe infringement of parental responsibilities, duties and rights.19 in 
the light of article 114 paragraph 2 of the Fa (2003), a parent shall be considered abusing 
or severely violating parental responsibilities, duties and rights if he/she:
1.  inflicts physical or emotional violence on the child, including exposure to violence 
among adult family members,
2.  abuses the child sexually,
3.  exploits the child, forcing it to excessive labour or labour which is not appropriate 
for its age,
4.  permits the child to consume alcoholic beverages, drugs or other narcotics,
5.  guides the child to socially unacceptable behaviour,
7.  does not provide the child with proper care as its non-resident parent,
8.  does not create, without having justified grounds for not doing so, conditions for 
joint life with the child within a period of three years after becoming its non-resi-
dent parent,
9.  does not provide for the basic needs of the child as its resident parent or does not 
adhere to the measures previously passed by a competent body for the sake of pro-
tection of the rights and wellbeing of the child,
10. in any other way severely abuses the rights of the child.
as presented above, the Fa (2003) does not regard parents’ intellectual and physical 
disabilities as a reason for divestment of his/her parental rights. only if a parent with in-
tellectual and physical disabilities has abused or severely violated his/her parental respon-
sibilities, duties and rights in one of the ways laid down in article 114 paragraph 2 of the 
Fa (2003), he/she could be deprived of parental rights like any other parent.  
it is rather unusual that the psychophysical condition of a. K. lead to deprivation of 
her parental rights but not to deprivation of her capacity for work, even though the Fa 
19   article 114 paragraph 1 of the Fa (2003)
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(2003) foresaw the possibility of full or partial deprivation of capacity for work. if she had 
been deprived of capacity for work, a guardian would have been appointed to her in order 
to protect her fundamental human rights which could not obviously be protected by her-
self, such as the right to family life with her child.20 actually, the purpose of guardianship 
as an institute from the field of family law is protection of the rights and interest of per-
sons who, due to their condition, might get into an underprivileged position with respect 
to other persons or groups.21
The same authority is competent of conducting adoption proceedings and of care for 
people who are incapable of defending their rights and interests, so what is even more 
surprising is the fact that in the case of A.K. and L. v. C, the welfare Centre made an 
adoption decision referring to the protection of the interests of the child and at the same 
time completely neglected the rights and interests of the mother with intellectual disabil-
ities. particularly worrying is the fact that the welfare Centre did only fail to provide the 
mother with necessary aid after the divestment of her parental rights but also excluded 
her from making any decisions relating to her child. moreover, it did not take so long at 
all for the welfare Centre to make a decision on child adoption whereat it fully neglected 
the mother’s appeal to get her son back, try to care for him and create conditions for living 
with him. one can conclude that the competent bodies made a huge mistake in this case 
and thus violated the fundament human rights of both the mother and her son.
iv.   best iNterests oF tHe CHilD aND tHe pareNtal 
rigHts oF pareNts witH iNtelleCtUal Disabilities 
it is quite certain, as pointed out by b. rešetar, that the institute of parental care will 
remain immortal in its core and exist as long as the human race. on the other hand, 
one cannot ignore the fact that the world unstoppably goes on and brings what used 
to be unimaginable.22 once it was believed that persons with intellectual disabilities 
20   on the family law regulation of the status of persons deprived of capacity for work see in i. milas, ’’Obitel-
jskopravni status osoba lišenih poslovne sposobnosti, eng. The Status of Persons Deprived of Capacity for 
Work in Family Law’’, Zagreb, pravni fakultet sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 2005. more on the role of a guardian 
in the protection of persons who are incapable of protecting their rights and liabilities see in i. milas 
Klarić, ’’Pravni status skrbnika kao jamstvo zaštite ljudskih prava odraslih osoba, eng. The Legal Status of 
a Guardian as a Guarantee of Protection of Human Rights of Adults“, Zagreb, pravni fakultet sveučilišta 
u Zagrebu, 2010.
21   similarly J. Džankić and i. milas Klarić, ’’Uloga skrbnika u zaštiti osobnosti osobe lišene poslovne sposob-
nosti, eng.The role of a guardian in the protection of the personality of persons Deprived of Capacity for 
work’’, Pravnik, vol. 44, no. 88, 2010, p. 89.
22   b. rešetar, ’’Pravna zaštita prava na (zajedničku) roditeljsku skrb – kamo vodi ovaj put kojim smo krenuli, 
eng. Legal protection of the Right to (Joint) Parental Care – the Path We Have Taken?’’, Pravna zaštita prava 
na (zajedničku) roditeljsku skrb, osijek, pravni fakultet sveučilišta J.J.strossmayera u osijeku, 2012, p. 244.
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were incapable of providing adequate care for their children and could not benefit from 
teaching programmes23. Consequently, the parental rights of persons with intellectual 
disabilities used to be fully marginalized. today the possibility of exercising their pa-
rental rights is in the focus of interests of numerous experts.24 There is much more ac-
knowledgement than before that while many such parents face specific and challenging 
problems, they remain parents, with the same hopes and fears as others.25
taking into consideration all presented in relation to the case A. K. and L. v. C. so 
far, one faces the question if the principle of the best interests of the child contradicts 
the prior right and duty of parents to provide their children with care in situations in 
which a child’s parent is a person with intellectual disabilities. in order to answer the 
question if there is a conflict between the principle of the best interest of the child and 
the prior right and duty of parents to provide their child with care in situations in which 
a child’s parent is a person with intellectual disabilities, one should first define what the 
best interest of the child in such situations really is. 
The Convention on the rights of the Child26 prescribes that ’’in all actions concerning 
children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of 
law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be 
a primary consideration’’.27 The preamble of the Convention on the rights of the Child 
states that ’’child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her personality, 
should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and un-
derstanding“. This Convention prescribes that the child shall have the right to parental 
23   see e. emerson et al., ’’Clinical psychology and people with intellectual Disabilities’’, malden/oxford/west 
sussex, John wiley & sons, 2012, p. 296.
24   see, for instance, C. andritschke, Was lässt Eltern mit geistiger Behinderung zu schwierigen Fällen werden?: 
Befunde, Konflikte, Herausforderungen, Hamburg, Diplom.de, 2010; H. Cleaver et al., Children’s Needs – 
Parenting Capacity: Child abuse, Parental mental illness, learning disability, substance misuse, and domes-
tic violence, london, The stationery office, 2011; g. llewellyn et al. (ed.), Parents with Intellectual Disa-
bilities: Past, Present and Futures, west sussex/oxford/ malden, John wiley & sons, 2010; r. mildon et al. 
, Best Practice in Parenting Education: Understanding and Supporting Parents with Learning Difficulties, 
Carlton, victorian parenting Centre, 2011; K. maclean and m. aunos, ´addressing the Needs of parents 
with intellectual Disabilities: exploring a parenting pilot project´, Journal on Developmental Disabilities, 
vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 18-33.; K. schiborr, Zur Lebenssituation von Eltern mit geistiger Behinderung und ihren 
Kindern, griN verlag, 2003 etc.
25   s. mcgaw, ´what works for parents with learning Disabilities? – summary´, 2000, available at http://
www.barnardos.org.uk/wwparwld.pdf, (accessed 2 December 2015.)
26   The Convention on the rights of the Child was adopted at the 44th session of the general assembly of the 
United Nations held on 20 November 1989 (resolution no. 44/25) and it came into force on 2 september 
1990. pursuant to the Decision on publishing multilateral treaties to which Croatia has been a contracting 
party based on succession recognitions (official gazette – international treaties no. 12/93), Croatia has 
been a contracting party to the Convention on the rights of the Child since 8 october 1991.
27   article 7 paragraph 1 of the Convention on the rights of the Child
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care28 and that it shall not be separated from its parents against their will29. if separation 
is necessary due to protection of the interests of the child, all the persons whose inter-
ests are being decided upon shall have the right to participate and be heard in proceed-
ings dealing with their rights and interests.
The Convention on the rights of persons with Disabilities30 prescribes that ’’States 
Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against 
their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in 
accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the 
best interests of the child. In no case shall a child be separated from parents on the basis 
of a disability of either the child or one or both of the parents.’’31
The foreword of the guidelines for practice on National and intercountry adoption 
and Foster Family Care32 governs that ’’as a matter of principle, all efforts should be di-
rected to ensuring that children be raised by their own families’’ and the basic principles 
of these guidelines set forth that ’’priority for a child is to be cared for by his/her biologi-
28   article 7 of the Convention on the rights of the Child:
´(1) The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the 
right to acquire a nationality and. as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.
(2) States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law and 
their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where the child 
would otherwise be stateless.´
29   article 9 paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the Convention on the rights of the Child:
´(1)States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will, 
except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with applicable law 
and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child. Such determination may 
be necessary in a particular case such as one involving abuse or neglect of the child by the parents, or one 
where the parents are living separately and a decision must be made as to the child’s place of residence.
(2)In any proceedings pursuant to paragraph 1 of the present article, all interested parties shall be given an 
opportunity to participate in the proceedings and make their views known.
(3) States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one or both parents to maintain 
personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the 
child’s best interests.´
30   Convention on the rights of persons with Disabilities and its optional protocol was adopted on 13 De-
cember 2006 at the United Nations Headquarters in New york, entered into force on 3 may 2008. Croatia 
signed the Convention on the rights of persons with Disabilities in 2007.
31   art. 23. par. 4. Convention on the rights of persons with Disabilities
32   ´ The Child’s right to grow Up in a Family: guidelines for practice on National and intercountry adoption 
and Foster Family Care´ (1997). This document provides guidelines for practice on national and inter-
country adoption and foster family care, developed under the aegis of the international Council on social 
welfare and incorporating the work of over 200 practitioners, experts, and government officials repre-
senting nearly 30 countries. available at http://eric.ed.gov/?id=eD423025, (accessed 1 December 2015.) 
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cal parent/s’’33 and that ’’governments and societies shall commit themselves to providing 
families the possibility and encouragement to care for their own children.’’34
From the legal point of view it is impossible to give a single answer to the question 
in which situations it is in the best interest of the child that its parent with intellectual 
disabilities does not provide it with care without an interdisciplinary approach to this 
vital and legally very delicate issue. assessment of the type and intensity of the risk for 
the child when its parent does not provide it with proper care, no matter if the inade-
quate care results from the parent’s intellectual disabilities or any other reason, is most-
ly an exceptionally complex task.35 The answer to the question if support of the family 
or detachment of the child is the key that resolves this issue in the event of inadequate 
parental care depends on the circumstances of every single case.36 
However, it should be noted that the respective literature often highlights that an in-
tellectual disability per se is a poor indicator of parental capacity and that there are many 
other factors that will influence a parent with an intellectual disability’s capacity to pro-
vide adequate care to their children, such as poverty, unemployment, social isolation, 
stress, domestic violence etc.37  a. lamont and l. bromfield stress that the experience 
33  principle 3.3.
34  principle 3.4.
35   see m. ajduković (ed.) and t. radočaj (ed.), ´pravo djeteta na život u obitelji: stručna pomoć obiteljima s 
djecom i nadzor nad izvršavanjem roditeljske skrbi kao proces podrške za uspješno roditeljstvo, eng. The 
right of the Child to live in a Family: professional Help provided to Families with Children and super-
vision over providing Childcare as a process of support for successful parenthood´, UNiCeF office for 
Croatia, 2008.
36   Not speaking about the context of the risks exclusively caused by parents’ intellectual disabilities but 
generally about the risk factors for the child in a family, m. ajduković claims that most countries have in-
tegrated the ’’family support’’ model, which concentrates on strengthening of the family in order to enable 
it to perform its function of bringing up children, with the ’’saving children’’ model or with their separation 
from a risky environment. This author also shares the opinion that both models have their good and bad 
sides. Hence, putting a primary focus on ´saving children” leads to situations in which many children are 
separated from families who had, with appropriate expert support, a potential to provide these children 
with good care. on the other hand, preference of the ´family support” model brings to short-term and 
multiple separation and return of children to their families, which additionally jeopardizes their sanity. 
Therefore it is necessary, from the viewpoint of m. ajduković, to find the right balance between these 
two approaches, taking account of the best interest of the child in every single case. m. ajduković, ´rane 
intervencije i ostale intervencije u zajednici kao podrška roditeljima pod rizicima, eng. early and other in-
terventions within a Community as support to parents at risk´, Prava djeteta na život u obitelji, UNiCeF 
office for Croatia, 2008, p. 74.
37   see, for example, H. Cleaver et al., ´Children’s Needs - parenting Capacity: The impact of parental mental 
illness, problem alcohol and Drug Use, and Domestic violence on Children’s Development´,  The station-
ery office, london, 1999, a. lamont i l. bromfield, ´parental intellectual disability and child protection: 
Key issues´, National Child protection Clearinghouse, australian institute of Family studies, melbourne, 
2009, available at https://aifs.gov.au/cfca/publications/parental-intellectual-disability-and-child-protec-
tion-key-i, (accessed 21 December 2015).
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of these factors does not mean that parents are at high risk of abusing their children - 
the problem might increase the risk, but could be counter-balanced by other protective 
factors. even where the risk is high, it does not mean that parents definitely will abuse or 
neglect their children. However, identification of risk factors is valuable as it may help 
to determine the support needs of parents with intellectual disabilities, or situations 
where the risk of children’s safety and wellbeing is unacceptable high.38 They also assert 
that many parents with intellectual disabilities will be able to provide sufficient and sup-
portive care to their children, however others will need additional support and training. 
The capacity for the service system to accommodate the support needs of such parents 
is a critical step in trying to reduce the over-representation of parents with intellectual 
disabilities in the child protection system. 39 ’’parents with an intellectual disability are 
not a homogenous group. Cognitive limitations vary from individual to individual and 
iq testing fails to reflect the way in which individuals adapt to their environments or 
their social functioning. it is important for each case featuring a parent with an intel-
lectual disability be assessed individually with consideration given to the risk and the 
protective factors. when concerns regarding parental capacity are raised, practitioners 
making assessments, need to focus on how the parent’s intellectual disability or learning 
difficulty is affecting their parenting and whether they are experiencing other stressors 
that may increase the risk of children experiencing abuse or neglect“.40
m. a. Field and v. a. sanchez also suggest that the ability of a parent to provide ad-
equate childcare cannot be predicted on the basis of intelligence alone and that as with 
parents without disabilities, the ability to parent successfully depends on a wide range of 
factors.41 some parents with intellectual disabilities may neglect their child, but it is not 
clear whether children of parents with intellectual disabilities are at greater risk than 
other children - particularly given the variation in the degree of intellectual disabilities 
and the impact it may have on children’s safety and wellbeing. 42
a similar standpoint is promoted by a. tymchuk and m. Feldman who also hold that 
parents with intellectual disabilities, like any other group, are diverse with regard to their 
parenting skills so that parent intelligence is a poor predictor of parenting capacity.43
38  a. lamont and l. bromfield (2009)
39  a. lamont and l. bromfield (2009)
40  a. lamont and l. bromfield (2009)
41   m. a. Field and v. a. sanchez, Equal Treatment for People with Mental Retardation: Having and Raising 
Children, Cambridge, Harvard University press, 1999.
42   a. lamont and l. bromfield, ´parental intellectual disability and child protection: Key issues´, available 
at https://aifs.gov.au/cfca/publications/parental-intellectual-disability-and-child-protection-key-i, (ac-
cessed 21 December 2015).
43   a. tymchuk and m. Feldman, ´parents with mental retardation and their children: review of research 
relevant to professional practice´, Canadian Psychology, vol. 32, 1991, pp. 486-496.
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if the conclusions on the parental rights of persons with disabilities, which can be 
found in contemporary works belonging to other scientific disciplines, are adjusted to 
the legal frameworks for the parental rights of persons with disabilities, one has to con-
clude that parents with disabilities should not experience discrimination based on ste-
reotypes and presumptions about their parenting capacity. such a stance is held by the 
eCtHr too. The case of A. K. and L. v. C. is not the only case in which the eCtHr has 
been invited to adjudicate on violation of the right to the private and family life of the 
child and its disabled parent as a consequence of separation of the child from the fam-
ily only on the ground of the parent’s disability. The case-law of the eCtHr constantly 
warns us that separation of a child from its family due to a parent’s disability may lead 
to infringement of the right to respect for private and family life under article 8 of the 
eCHr.44 
it is beyond any doubt that welfare centres should be the ones to undertake a meas-
ure for the  protection of the personal interests of the child or to, if need be, propose 
pronouncement of one of the repressive measures by the court if they assess that a par-
ent (due to his/her intellectual disabilities) does not provide proper childcare. although 
44   p. bartlett points out that eCtHr case 46544/99 Kutzner v. Germany [2002] ´is the first family law case to 
be brought by parents with intellectual disabilities´; p. bartlett, Mental Disability and the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, leiden/boston, brill, 2006, page 195.
in the Kutzner v. Germany case, the applicants were parents with mild intellectual disabilities who lived 
with their two daughters, who were late developers, and who were receiving educational assistance and 
support. a court withdrew the applicants’ parental rights and ordered their placement with foster parents 
on the grounds that applicants did not have the intellectual capacity required to bring up their children. 
The girls were placed in separate, unidentified foster homes. The applicants’ visiting rights were sharp-
ly restricted. The applicants alleged a breach of article 8, arguing that the withdrawal of their parental 
rights over their daughters and their placement with foster parents had infringed the applicants’ right to 
respect for family life under article 8. although the authorities may have had legitimate concerns about 
the late development of the children, the eCtHr considered that both the care order itself and the manner 
in which it was implemented were unsatisfactory. bearing in mind the children’s age, severing contact 
and limiting visiting rights could lead only to the children’s increased ´alienation´ from their parents and 
from each other. The interference was therefore not proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. quoted 
from J. Fialaet al. (ed.), ´summaries of mental Disability Cases Decided by the european Court of Human 
rights´, mental Disability advocacy Center, 2007.
eCtHr case 39948/06 Saviny v. Ukraine [2008] concerned the placement of children in public care on 
the ground that their parents, who have both been blind since childhood, had failed to provide them with 
adequate care and housing. The domestic authorities based their decision on a finding that the applicants’ 
lack of financial means and personal qualities endangered their children’s life, health and moral upbring-
ing. The Court held that there had been violation of article 8 (right to respect of private and family life) of 
the Convention, doubting the adequacy of the evidence on which the authorities had based their finding 
that the children’s living conditions had in fact been dangerous to their life and health. it was observed in 
particular that the judicial authorities had only examined those difficulties which could have been over-
come by targeted financial and social assistance and effective counselling and had not apparently analysed 
in any depth the extent to which the applicants’ irremediable incapacity to provide requisite care had been 
responsible for the inadequacies of their children’s upbringing.  Downloaded from the eCtHr webpage, 
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Fs_parental_eNg.pdf, (accessed 1 December 2015).
see also eCtHr case 35731/97 Venema v. The Netherlands [2002].
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the possible conflict between the best interests of the child and the prior right of a par-
ent with intellectual disabilities may be viewed through all the repressive measures for 
the protection of the personal interests of the child foreseen by family law legislation45, 
the child can be adopted without consent of its parent only if he/she has been divested 
of his/her parental rights. accordingly, against the will of the parent, none of the other 
repressive measures can result in irreversible termination of the parent-child bond as a 
result of child adoption.46 
The moment of the assessment if the child’s right to family life needs to be pro-
tected by   withholding it from adoption is indicative and decisive indeed.47 it seems 
that this issue as well as responses thereto are even more complex when a decision on 
the adoption of a child of parents with intellectual disabilities is to be made. in such 
situations it is impossible to provide a single answer to the question where to draw a 
line between the best interest of the child and the prior right of its parents to provide 
childcare without interdisciplinary analysis of the circumstances of every single case.48 
still, the importance of providing persons with intellectual disabilities with assistance 
and support and of protecting the family bond between the child and its parent with 
intellectual disabilities instead of breaking it, is nowadays growing.49 as C. watkins 
stated, if we are truly concerned about the welfare of children, we should invest more 
45   on repressive measures for the protection of personal rights and wellbeing of the child from the inter-
disciplinary, comparative and international aspect, see b. rešetar and s. aras, Represivne mjere za zaštitu 
osobnih prava i dobrobiti djeteta, eng. Repressive Measures for the Protection of the Personal Rights and 
Wellbeing of the Child, osijek, pravni fakultet sveučilišta J.J.strossmayera u osijeku, 2014.
46   The Fa (2015) foresees exceptional cases in which a parent’s’ consent for child adoption may be substituted 
by a court decision in non-contentious proceedings. see Chapter v.
47   similarly in D. Hrabar, ´pravo djeteta na obiteljski život, eng. The Child’s right to Family life´, Dijete i 
društvo, vol. 7, no. 2, 2005, page 391.
48   The psychological-sociological aspects of adoption represent an inseparable part of the legal dimension of 
this institute. D. Jakovac-lozić, Posvojenje, eng. Adoption, split, pravni fakultet sveučilišta u splitu, 2000, 
p. 169.
49   There are a large number of projects indicating it. e.g., the european Commission within the lifelong 
learning programme co-funded project ´PID - Parents with Intellectual Disabilities - EUROPEAN FAM-
ILY SET.´ The overall objective of the project is based on the 2006 Convention on the rights of persons 
with Disabilities, article 23. The project will meet this convention by supporting people with disabilities 
in matters of marriage, family, parenthood, and relationship, prevent separation of families, learning from 
good practice examples from all over the world, developing family competences by intergeneration/family 
learning, etc. see http://www.docfoc.com/european-family-set-parents-with-intellectual-disabilities, (ac-
cessed, 1 December 2015).
United Kingdom’s Department of Health fund the project ´Inclusive support for parents with a learning 
disability´. see report that describes this project available at https://www.mencap.org.uk/sites/default/
files/documents/2011-03/making%20the%20difference.pdf, (1 December 2015).
The australian government has funded a capacity-building model known as ´Healthy Start: A national 
strategy for children of parents with intellectual disabilities´. see more in D. mcConnell et al., ´Healthy 
start.” a National strategy for parents with intellectual Disabilities and Their Children´, Journal of Policy 
and Practice in Intellectual Disabilities, vol. 5, no.3, 2008, pp. 194-202.
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money and energy in preventive services for families rather than in parental rights 
termination.50 The success of the family law protection of the family depends primarily 
on the willingness to ensure, at institutional level, sufficient funds, services and aid 
for parents providing proper childcare.51 a society has to demonstrate willingness to 
embrace people with any mental disability and to apply modern models for providing 
support to these people.52 
Concerning all the aforementioned, one can draw the conclusion that divesting par-
ents with intellectual disabilities of parental rights may be justified only in situations in 
which regardless of all the necessary assistance provided by the system, the parent is 
in no way capable to provide proper childcare, so the best interest of the child should 
be protected by entrusting it to another person. since such a parent is not in position 
to exercise his/her parental rights, it makes no sense to elaborate the conflict between 
his/her parental rights and best interest of the child. in case a parent with intellectual 
disabilities is capable of providing childcare within acceptable level, he/she should not 
be deprived of his/her parental rights.53 Divestment of parental rights in regard to a 
parent who is, though with assistance of the system, capable of providing proper child-
care does not facilitate but supress the child’s interests. Therefore, it is to ascertain that 
there should be no conflict between the best interest of the child and the prior right 
and duty of parents to provide childcare if a child’s parent is a person with intellectual 
disabilities.
The United states National Council on Disability (independent federal agency making recommendations 
to the president, Congress and other federal agencies regarding policies, programs, practices, and proce-
dures that affect people with disabilities, to enhance the quality of life for all americans with disabilities 
and their families) 2012 made a report ´Rocking the Cradle: Ensuring the Rights of Parents with Disabil-
ities and Their Children´, available at https://www.ncd.gov/rawmedia_repository/89591c1f_384e_4003_
a7ee_0a14ed3e11aa.pdf, (accessed 1 December 2015.). The goal of  Rocking the Cradle  is to advance 
understanding and promote the rights of parents with disabilities and their children. the report provides 
a comprehensive review of the obstacles people with diverse disabilities, experience when exercising 
their fundamental right to create and maintain families, as well as persistent, systemic, and pervasive 
discrimination against parents with disabilities. 
50   C. watkins, ´beyond status: The americans with Disabilities act and the parental rights of people labe-
led Developmentally Disabled or mentally retarded´, California Law Review, vol. 83, no. 6, 1995, pp. 1475.
51   a. Korać graovac, ’’obiteljskopravna zaštita osobnih interesa djece prije izdvajanja iz obitelji: prava djece 
– odgovornosti i prava roditelja, eng. The Family law protection of the personal interests of Children prior 
to the separation from Their Families: the Children’s rights – the parents’ liabilities and rights)’’, Prava 
djeteta na život u obitelji, UNiCeF office for Croatia, 2008, pp. 53-54.
52  t. Not (2008), p. 339.
53  Certainly, if there is no any other reason for divestment of parental rights.
376 NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EU AND NATIONAL LABOUR LAW
v.   REsPONsE OF THE NEW FAMILY LAW LEGIsLATION TO 
THE CAsE OF A.K. AND L. v. C.
speaking within the sphere of the protection of parental and other rights of persons 
with intellectual disabilities granted by the new family law legislation54, it should be noted 
that the Fa (2015) has abandoned the institute of full deprivation of capacity for work. as 
highlighted by s. aras, beside abandoning the institute of full deprivation of capacity for 
work and enhancing the procedural law position of people subject to proceedings for dep-
rivation of capacity for work, the Fa (2015) has raised the quality of the provisions on the 
guardianship of adults with disabilities, taking into account the autonomy of their will.55
taking into consideration the viewpoints of the eCtHr expressed in the judgment 
both in the case of A.K. and L. v. C. and in the case of X v. C.56, the Fa (2015) has paid great 
attention to the case-law protection of the interests of parents who are not capable of 
protecting their rights and interests.57 Unlike the Fa (2003), the Fa (2015) does not regard 
deprivation of capacity for work as the reason why parent’s consent for child adoption is 
not required. pursuant to article 188 of the Fa (2015), a parent’s consent is not required 
only if the parent has:
1. died, disappeared or is not known or 
2. been divested of parental rights. 
if consent for child adoption is to be given by a parent deprived of capacity for work, 
irrespective of his/her partial or full incapacity, the parent shall be able to understand the 
meaning of consent for the adoption and the competent welfare centre is obliged to in-
form him/her about the appertaining consequences. if a parent incapacitated for work is 
not capable of comprehending the meaning of consent for the adoption, his/her consent 
54   which other significant novelties have been introduced into the family law legislation by the Family act 
(official gazette no. 75/14), that have been incorporated in the Fa (2015) see in s. ledić, ´glavne znača-
jke reforme obiteljskog prava i postupka, eng. main Features of the Family law and procedure reform´, 
Aktualnosti hrvatskog zakonodavstva i pravne prakse, vol. 21, 2014, pp. 197-233.
55   see s. aras, ´Što donosi novi obiteljski zakon, eng.what brings the New Family act?´, Pravo i porezi, vol. 
24, No. 11, 2015, page 25.
56   XeCtHr case 11223/04 X v. Croatia [2008]. in this case, the eCtHr found violation of article 8 of the 
eCHr since the state had, by not preventing the exclusion of the applicant as a person incapacitated for 
work from the proceedings having resulted in the adoption of her daughter, failed to secure respect for her 
private and family life. more on this and other judgments of the eCtHr relating to the Croatia and the area 
of the protection of people with mental disorders see in i. milas Klarić, ´reforma skrbničkog zakonod-
avstva i europski pravni okvir (reform of the guardianship legislation and european legal Framework)´, 
Godišnjak akademije pravnih znanosti Hrvatske, vol. 5, no. 1, 2014, pp. 103-110.
57   although a.K. was not deprived of capacity for work, she was mildly mentally retarded, because of which 
she was capable of protecting her rights and interest in an adequate way.
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can be substituted by a court decision58, but in compliance with article 190 paragraph 
1 item 3 of the Fa (2015), it shall be only possible if the parent is incapable of providing 
childcare to such an extent that he/she is not capable of providing any segment of child-
care on a permanent basis and there is no chance that the child will be raised by the child’s 
close relatives and the child is expected to benefit from the adoption.59
as far as the case of A.K. and L. v. C. is concerned, the provisions of the Fa (2015) 
regulating adoption proceedings, particularly the protection of the rights and interests of 
a person incapacitated for work, could not though protect the rights and interests of a.K. 
since she was not deprived of capacity for work but of parental rights. yet, the previous 
lines suggest that according to the circumstances of this concrete case, it should not have 
come to divestment of parental rights in the first place. if the first applicant had not been 
divested of her parental rights, it would not have been possible, pursuant to the Fa (2015), 
to substitute her consent for the adoption with a court decision because she was not in-
capable of providing childcare to such an extent that she could not provide any segment 
of childcare on a permanent basis. besides, neither of the other two requirements under 
article 190 of the Fa (2015) for substitution of parent’s consent with a court decision was 
met. The requirements are as follows:
1. parent has been abusing or severely violating his/her parental responsibilities, duties 
and right or has been showing a lack of interest in the child for a longer period of time and 
adoption would be beneficial for the child,60
2. parent has been abusing or severely violating his/her parental responsibilities, duties 
and right for a shorter period of time but to such an extent that he/she will never be eligi-
ble for conferring the childcare on him/her on a permanent basis.
The Fa (2015) foresees the possibility of divesting a parent with intellectual disabilities 
of his/her parental rights in the event his/her mental ability is so limited that he/she is not 
capable of providing any segment of childcare on a permanent basis whereat the wellbeing 
of the child is put in jeopardy.61 otherwise, divestment of parental rights of a parent with 
intellectual disabilities may be initiated only if such a parent, like any other non-disabled 
parent:
58   a court decision in non-contentious proceedings which is made following a proposal of a welfare centre.
59   which other forms of the protection of adults with disabilities is foreseen by the Family act (2015) see in 
s. aras, pp. 28-30. 
60   The court shall reject any proposal for making a decision substituting a parent’s consent for child adoption 
if the welfare centre did not previously notice the parent thereabout or inform him/her about the possibil-
ity of being pronounced the measure of intensive professional help or if it has been less than three months 
since the day of the notice or if it has been less than three months since the first attempt to determine 
the parent’s place of living in case it was not possible to give notice to the parent due to his/her unknown 
address. see articles 189 and 190 of the Fa (2015).
61  article 171 paragraph 1 item 6 of the Fa (2015)
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1.   abuses or severely violates his/her parental responsibilities, duties and rights,62
2.   has abandoned the child,
3.   if the child is exposed to violence among adult family members,
4.   if a report of the competent welfare centre implies that the parent does not honour 
the measures, decisions and instructions previously issued by a welfare centre or 
court for the purpose of protection of the rights and wellbeing of the child, 
5.   if a report or assessment of the competent welfare centre suggests that return of the 
child to its family after an implemented measure for protection of the rights and 
wellbeing of the child would represent a serious threat to the child’s life, health and 
development, and 
6.   based on a valid verdict against the parent in cases involving some of the crimes 
explicitly laid down in the Fa (2015), which have been committed against his/her 
child.63
like the Fa (2003), the Fa (2015) also requires no consent for child adoption in case a 
parent has been deprived of his/her parental rights. Nevertheless, the Fa (2015) stipulates 
that the competent welfare centre shall provide a parent divested of parental rights with 
the possibility to express his/her opinion on possible child adoption. The parent’s opinion 
is not binding, but the welfare centre experts are obliged to take such an opinion into con-
sideration when making assessment if adoption in a concrete case is the most convenient 
form of permanent child placement.64
if a person is deprived of capacity for work in the part referring to the exercise of his/
her parental rights, these rights shall, according to the Fa (2015), be suspended. During 
the suspension, daily childcare may be provided individually by the person in question or 
collectively with the other parent or the child’s guardian. suspension of parental rights 
due to legal obstacles shall be terminated if the reasons for the suspension seize to exist.65
what is particularly important in this context is that the Fa (2015) foresees the pos-
sibility of providing professional help and support in the exercise of parental rights. The 
competent welfare centre shall supply parents with professional help and support if it 
finds that they are not capable of autonomously providing full or partial childcare due 
to circumstances affecting them or the child whereat the child’s development is put in 
jeopardy but not its life or health.66 such a measure shall be pronounced if a child grows 
62  article 170 of the Fa (2015)
63  article 171 paragraph 1 items 1-5 of the Fa (2015)
64  see article 210 of the Fa (2015)
65  see article 114 of the Fa (2015)
66  This measure is regulated in articles 140-144 of the Fa (2015)
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up in a risky environment and the parents (or other persons who provide childcare on a 
daily basis) are not capable of providing autonomous and proper childcare due to special 
circumstances, including parents’ intellectual disabilities.
The presented overview and analysis of the relevant provisions of the Fa (2015) reveal 
major improvements in the protection of the parental rights of persons with intellectual 
disabilities. still, it should not be forgotten that “no reform can succeed if the perception 
is not changed, so it is necessary to provide people with intellectual disability with social 
support at all levels in order to help them preserve and reinforce what they have all in 
common – their own dignity.“67
vi.  CoNClUsioN
while once it was common to think that parents with intellectual disabilities are not 
capable of providing proper childcare, today there is a growing number of those who real-
ize that parental intellectual disability affects parenting capacity to the extent that parents 
with intellectual disability are unable to provide adequate care for their children and that 
the diagnosis of intellectual disability per se is a poor indicator of risk for child abuse and 
neglect. Here the emphasis is put on assuring aid and support to people with intellectual 
disabilities in providing childcare in order to protect, where possible, the child-parent 
bond instead of breaking it.
The case of A. K. and L. v. C. makes us consider if Croatian institutions keep track with 
contemporary world trends when it comes to providing parents with intellectual disabil-
ities with assistance and support in the exercise of their parental rights and protection of 
the bond between the child and its parent with intellectual disabilities. Judging by the con-
clusions of the national court in the reasoning of the decision based on which mother a. 
K. was divested of her parental rights, after which the child was soon adopted without her 
consent, one can conclude that there is not enough awareness that the right of a parent 
with intellectual disabilities to family life with his/her children does not differentiate from 
the same right of any other parent. what is particularly upsetting in this case is that a.K. 
has never done direct harm to the child and showed, despite her intellectual disabilities, 
a wish to provide childcare. apart from contesting the divestment of her parental rights, 
she did everything to remedy what the welfare Centre assessed risky for the child. she 
claimed that she had rehabilitated the housing premises and installed a heating system as 
well as that she did not live with her mentally brother any more since he had been placed 
67   a. Korać graovac i a. Čulo, ´Konvencija o pravima osoba s invaliditetom – novi pristup shvaćanju prava 
osoba s duševnim smetnjama, eng. Convention on the rights of persons with Disabilities – a New ap-
proach to persons with mental Disorders), Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, vol. 61, no. 1, 
2011, p. 106.
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in an institution. when doing all those things aimed at demonstrating that she can be a 
good parent and that she can live with her child, she was not provided, at least that is what 
the judgment in the case of A. K. and L. v. C. discloses, with any assistance by the system. 
There is a hope that the case of mother a. K. will remain an exception to the rule that 
Croatia institutions act in accordance with the protection of the parental rights of persons 
with intellectual disabilities.
encouraged by the conclusions of the eCtHr in the case of a. K. and l. v. C, the 
Croatian legislator has made significant improvements in the Fa (2015) regarding the 
protection of the parental rights of those who have no capacity to protect their own rights 
and interests. among other things, it is essential to mention that deprivation of capacity 
for work is no longer a reason why a parent’s consent for child adoption is not required. if 
consent for child adoption is given by a parent deprived of capacity for work, he/she shall 
be able to understand its meaning and the competent welfare centre is obliged to inform 
him/her about the legal and factual consequences of the adoption in an appropriate way. if 
a parent deprived of capacity for work is not able to comprehend the meaning of consent 
for child adoption, his/her consent can be substituted with a court decision, but only if the 
parent is incapable of providing childcare to such an extent that he/she is not capable of 
providing any segment of childcare on a permanent basis and there is no chance that the 
child will be raised by the child’s close relatives and the child is expected to benefit from 
the adoption. The Fa (2015) foresees the possibility of divesting a parent with intellectual 
disabilities of his/her parental rights in the event his/her mental ability is so limited that 
he/she is not capable of providing any segment of childcare on a permanent basis whereat 
the wellbeing of the child is put in jeopardy. besides, the Fa (2015) has introduced the 
institute of suspension of parental rights, according to which the parental rights of a per-
son incapacitated for work are suspended as long as the circumstances having led to the 
suspension are present. it is vastly important to highlight the professional help and sup-
port in providing childcare, which is foresees by the Fa (2015) and intended for parents 
who are not capable of providing their children with autonomous and proper care due to 
special circumstance, including parents’ intellectual disabilities.
The case of A. K. and L. v. C. has encouraged us to realize that when deciding on the 
parental rights of persons with intellectual disabilities, one should never forget that ’’per-
sons with intellectual disabilities are different in abilities but not in the rights“68 and that 
parents’ intellectual disabilities should not be an incentive to disrespect the instruction 
in the guidelines for practice on National and intercountry adoption and Foster Family 
Care propagating that ’’ primary purpose of adoption is to provide a child with a family 
and a home to call his/her own and not to provide a child for a family’’.
68  t. Not (2008), page 339.
